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Abstract
This paper argues that differences in the dispersion of corporate ownership can help 
explain why party positions on corporate governance vary across countries and over 
time. Expectations that left/right conflicts should pitch capital against labor overlook 
that “capital” is not a homogenous constituency with regard to corporate governance 
issues. Two segments of capital with diverging interests need to be distinguished: “insid-
ers” with voice over company management, and “outsiders” who exercise arms-length 
control by threatening exit. Party positions depend on the relative size of the insider and 
outsider constituencies, which in turn depends on countries’ prevailing structure of 
corporate ownership. The paper draws on evidence from British, German and French 
political debates over takeover regulation from the 1950s onward. It speaks to the litera-
tures on party competition, corporate governance, Varieties of Capitalism and institu-
tional change.
Zusammenfassung
Dieses Papier argumentiert, dass Unterschiede in der Streuung von Unternehmens-
besitz miterklären, warum Parteipositionen zum Thema Corporate Governance in 
verschiedenen Ländern und über Zeit stark variieren. Meist wird davon ausgegangen, 
dass Links/Rechts-Konflikte Kapital und Arbeit gegenüberstellen. Dabei wird überse-
hen, dass „Kapital“ in Bezug auf Unternehmenskontrolle kein homogenes Ganzes ist. 
Zwei Gruppen mit divergierenden Interessen müssen unterschieden werden: „Insiders“, 
die ein direktes Mitspracherecht in der Unternehmensführung haben, und „Outsiders“, 
die indirekt Kontrolle ausüben, indem sie mit Ausstieg drohen. Parteipositionen un-
terscheiden sich mit dem Größenverhältnis der Insider- und Outsider-Gruppen, die 
wiederum von der Struktur des Unternehmenseigentums abhängt. Das Papier stützt 
sich auf politische Debatten zur Übernahmeregulierung in Großbritannien, Deutsch-
land und Frankreich seit den 1950er-Jahren. Es leistet einen Beitrag zur Forschung über 
Parteienwettbewerb, Corporate Governance, Spielarten des Kapitalismus und instituti-
onellen Wandel.
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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom and much of the political economy literature assumes that parties 
on the left favor the interests of stakeholders over shareholders. In Mark Roe’s (2003) 
influential argument, “social democracy” – through its presumed negative effect on 
agency costs and shareholder protections – is the main independent variable explaining 
cross-national differences in ownership dispersion. Roe assumes that minority share-
holders in countries where social democratic values prevail have more reason to fear 
that their interests will be trampled on, inducing owners to hold larger blocks of shares. 
The widespread assumption stems from the impression that traditional leftist ideology 
and commitments to working-class and low-income constituencies are incompatible 
with the distributional consequences of increased shareholder orientation. 
Recent empirical evidence challenges the conventional wisdom. Cioffi and Höpner 
(2006; Höpner 2007) go so far as to talk about a “political paradox.” They find that re-
cent shareholder-friendly reforms in Germany, Italy, France and the US were promoted 
by left-leaning parties, against resistance from the right. To explain their findings, Cioffi 
and Höpner identify a number of push and pull factors thought to influence party 
positions. Push factors inducing center-left parties to embrace corporate governance 
reform include the need to enhance electoral competitiveness by appealing to middle-
class voters, and the growing spread of shares among the public. Höpner (2007) adds 
that transparency gains from some shareholder-oriented reforms can benefit workers as 
well as shareholders, leading these two groups to unite against company managers. The 
main pull factor constraining center-right parties is a strong personal and professional 
connection between center-right parties and corporate elites, supposedly leading “poli-
ticians on the right to value managerial autonomy as matters of political expedience, 
personal economic interest, and ideological conviction” (Cioffi/Höpner 2006: 487).
My paper takes the enquiry one step further by systematically examining the conditions 
that give rise to the “political paradox” in one particular aspect of corporate governance. 
By mapping German, French and British party positions on takeover regulation from 
the 1950s onward, I show that the paradoxical pattern does not obtain everywhere. Re-
versed left/right positions are observable in Germany, where Social Democrats, Greens 
and Socialists all joined the Liberal Party to promote outside shareholder interests 
against Christian Democrat resistance. In Britain, left/right competition from the 1950s 
until Tony Blair’s 1997 election campaign was a straightforward battle between capital 
and labor, with Labour attacking the outsider-friendly takeover rules supported by the 
Conservatives. In France, left and right are barely distinguishable, with Socialists and 
Gaullists sharing an ambivalent stance on takeovers.
I am grateful to Luke Dauter and Martin Höpner for their helpful comments on a previous version 
of this paper.
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The documented variation contributes to growing evidence that different patterns of 
party competition correspond to different varieties of capitalism. Amable (2003) uses 
regression analysis to show that liberal market economies are more likely to be governed 
from the right than coordinated market economies. Callaghan and Höpner (2005) find 
that members of the European Parliament from countries scoring low on the La Porta 
Index of shareholder protection were less likely to support the EU takeover directive 
than delegates from countries scoring high on the index. Fioretos (2001) remarks that 
governments in EU negotiations act as though they were defending their country’s 
comparative institutional advantage. The present paper shows that Britain and Ger-
many – the closest real-world examples of a liberal and a coordinated market economy 
respectively – display strikingly different patterns of party competition on a policy issue 
that is considered to be central to generating the comparative institutional advantages 
of these national production regimes.
Yet any observed correlation between political preferences and economic structures, 
while intriguing, merely shifts the puzzle to another level. If party competition sys-
tematically differs across national production regimes, the question is: Why? The func-
tionalist explanation implicit in some of the early Varieties of Capitalism literature is 
not satisfactory. It may well be that rules which enhance the economic performance of 
liberal market economies are bad for coordinated market economies. However, as Hall 
and Soskice (2001: 52) note themselves, political choices are often motivated by consid-
erations other than efficiency. 
In search of mechanisms, recent research has examined the role of macropolitical in-
stitutions. Gourevitch and Shinn (2005), Pagano and Volpin (2005), and Iversen and 
Soskice (2006) all claim that political preferences and alignments on political economy 
issues are shaped by electoral systems. Among the mechanisms identified is the varying 
credibility of long-term political commitments under majoritarian versus proportional 
representation. Majoritarian systems like Britain are more likely to produce radical pol-
icy swings than PR systems, where coalition governments are the norm. Rational voters 
anticipating such swings should be less willing to support policy measures with pay-offs 
premised on long-term continuity. 
Such macropolitical accounts by themselves are not satisfactory because they fail to 
explain change over time. Empirically, voting systems have remained stable while party 
positions in many countries, including Germany, France and the UK, have shifted. Logi-
cally, the claim that the stability associated with proportional representation is necessary 
for coordinated market economies does not imply that the same condition is sufficient. 
The German political system may be more capable of offering long-term credibility of 
political commitments than the British, but the mere capacity to commit to the deals 
that sustain corporatist coalitions cannot force people to want them. 
I propose an alternative explanation, which links variation in party positions to cross-
national differences in the structure of corporate ownership by noting that, on corpo-
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rate governance issues, “capital” is not a homogenous constituency. Two segments of 
capital with diverging corporate governance interests need to be distinguished: “insid-
ers” with voice in company decision-making, and “outsiders” who exercise arms-length 
control by threatening exit. I argue that party platforms depend on the relative size 
of the insider and outsider constituencies, which in turn depends on the structure of 
corporate ownership. Beyond that, variation in ownership structure also contributes 
to explaining cross-national differences in the timing of debate. Two separate but re-
lated mechanisms are at work here. First, a pro-outsider constituency must first emerge 
before politicians will advance its cause. Where minority shareholders are rare, their 
concerns are less likely to attract widespread public attention. Second, public interest in 
takeover regulation tends to peak in the wake of high-profile hostile bids, and a minimal 
degree of ownership dispersion is a necessary precondition for such bids. 
Distinguishing between insiders and outsiders has a long tradition in the corporate 
governance literature, but my exploration of possible implications for party strategies 
represents a new endeavor. It builds on recent work by Rueda (2005, 2006), who shows 
how the divergent interests of employed and unemployed workers affect party posi-
tions on labor market issues. I argue that a similar insider–outsider divide on the capital 
side affects party positions on corporate governance issues. The segmentation of capital 
poses dilemmas for center-right parties that can be exploited by parties on the left just 
as, in Rueda’s analysis, conservative parties benefit from the strategic difficulties faced 
by social democratic parties due to the segmentation of labor. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents my argument that party platforms 
are influenced by ownership patterns. Section 3 presents the empirical evidence from 
which the argument was derived. It maps British, French and German political debates 
over takeover regulation from the 1950s onward and shows that differences in the tim-
ing and party positions correlate with cross-national differences in the structure of cor-
porate ownership. Section 4 spells out the implications of my argument for research on 
party politics, corporate governance, Varieties of Capitalism and institutional change. I 
close with some suggestions for further research.
2 The argument: How ownership structure affects party positions 
My explanation for the cross-national variation documented below links party po-
sitions and corporate ownership patterns as follows: Parties want to maximize their 
chances of winning office without abandoning their core clientele. Parties on the right 
cater to “upscale socio-economic groups.” Upscale groups comprise “insiders” and “out-
siders,” whose interests diverge on corporate governance issues. The optimal position 
of parties on the right varies with the relative size of the insider and outsider factions 
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among upscale voters. The relative size of the insider and outsider factions depends on 
the structure of corporate ownership. Therefore, party positions vary with the structure 
of corporate ownership. The following paragraphs discuss the assumptions underlying 
the critical steps of my argument.
My assumption that parties are both office-seeking and loyal to their core clienteles 
draws on two theories of party behavior that are distinct but often regarded as comple-
mentary. Vote-seeking theories assume that “[p]arties formulate policies in order to win 
elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies” (Downs 1957: 25, 
28). Conversely, policy-promoting theories assume that parties have electoral ambitions 
because they want to implement policies favoring their core constituencies (e.g. Hibbs 
1977). My argument is based on the compromise view that both motivations operate 
jointly, i.e. that “parties are organizations of political entrepreneurs who make strategic 
calculations even while implementing policies that are in the interest of their support-
ers” (Alt 1985: 1037; see also Frey/Schneider 1982 ; Strøm 1990).
To understand why upscale socio-economic groups are not a homogenous constituency 
on corporate governance issues, on needs to know that a major purpose of corporate 
governance is to address the principal–agent problems that arise in companies run by 
managers on behalf of shareholders. Which solutions are available to encourage share-
holder value maximization depends on the structure of corporate ownership. Large 
blockholders can supervise from the inside by threatening to use their seats on the su-
pervisory board and/or their majority of voting rights in the shareholders’ assembly to 
replace badly performing managers. Minority shareholders have fewer means of exer-
cising voice because, unlike large blockholders, they suffer from collective action prob-
lems. Greater ownership dispersion implies smaller incentives for each shareholder to 
invest resources into monitoring management. Instead, dispersed shareholders exercise 
arms-length control by threatening exit from badly managed companies.
Regarding takeover regulation, the interests of insiders and outsiders are almost dia-
metrically opposed. Outside shareholders like takeover rules that help them force man-
agers to maximize shareholder value. One such rule is the requirement that managers 
obtain authorization from shareholders before implementing so-called “poison pills” 
which may deter hostile bidders. Managers dislike such rules because the increased su-
pervision constrains their scope for acting as they see fit. Large blockholders have little 
reason to care one way or the other, because they have more direct means of keep-
ing managers in check, and because companies with concentrated ownership are rarely 
subject to hostile bids. 
These assumptions and observations imply that party positions should vary with the 
relative size of the insider and outsider factions. Parties wanting to maximize votes with-
out alienating their core clientele, faced with a situation where they cannot please all of 
it, should try to please whichever faction is larger. Where the insider faction dominates, 
the right should serve insiders. Where the outsider faction dominates, the right should 
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serve outsiders. (One might object that this crude model of party competition does 
not consider the number of political parties. If insiders and outsiders had diametrically 
opposed interests on most political issues, the smaller, neglected group would be better 
off in a separate party and could credibly threaten to defect – especially under voting 
systems that feature proportional representation. I ignore this possibility because cor-
porate governance is only one of many issues in a multidimensional issue space, and the 
insider–outsider split among upscale groups is not relevant across all of them.) 
The relative size of the insider and outsider factions should depend on the prevailing 
structure of corporate ownership, for at least three reasons. First, more dispersed own-
ership implies more outside shareholders. Second, dispersed ownership is a precondi-
tion for hostile takeovers, and where there are more hostile bids, there are more lawyers, 
investment bankers, stock market analysts et al. whose jobs depend on outsider-friendly 
takeover rules. Third, ownership structure defines the target group for anti-capitalist 
sentiments. Where ownership is widely dispersed, the typical owner of capital is an 
outside shareholder with a diversified and mobile portfolio. In countries like with con-
centrated capital ownership, large blockholders and banks are more likely villains for 
the left. 
I argue that the divergent demands of insiders and outsiders and cross-national varia-
tion in the relative size of these factions help explain cross-national differences in left/
right party positions. Conservative party positions differ because the relative size of 
the insider and outsider factions within their core constituency depends on owner-
ship structure. The positions of parties on the left differ because ownership structure 
defines the target group for anti-capitalist sentiments. In countries with concentrated 
ownership, where the main villains for the hard left are big banks and large blockhold-
ers, social democratic parties can better afford to support outside shareholders without 
alienating their base. 
Beyond that, variation in ownership structure also contributes to explaining cross-na-
tional differences in the timing of debate. Two separate but related mechanisms seem to 
be at work here. First, a pro-outsider constituency must first emerge before politicians 
will advance its cause. Where minority shareholders are rare, their concerns are less 
likely to attract widespread public attention. Second, public interest in takeover regu-
lation tends to peak in the wake of high-profile hostile bids, and a minimal degree of 
ownership dispersion is a necessary precondition for such bids. 
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3 The evidence: Party positions and corporate ownership patterns  
in Britain, Germany and France
A large-N study of whether ownership has a significant influence on party positions 
is beyond the scope of this paper and may be impossible to conduct. In theory, my 
argument could be falsified by showing the lack of a significant correlation between 
my dependent and independent variable, or, to challenge the direction of the causal 
arrow, proving that debate has tended to preceed rather than follow the emergence of 
a pro-outsider constituency. In practice, many other variables besides ownership – in-
cluding macropolitical institutions, party system, economic structure, political climate, 
historical legacies etc. – are likely to affect party positions on corporate governance is-
sues. Given the limited number of advanced industrial democracies, it is impossible to 
control for all of them. Moreover, mapping party positions over time for a large num-
ber of countries is a time-consuming endeavor, and measurement on a numeric scale 
is fraught with difficulties. (Corporate governance issues, which are too technical in 
nature to regularly appear in party manifestos, are not covered by the large manifestos 
project dataset [Budge et al. 2001].) 
All I can offer here is evidence for the three cases from which the argument was induc-
tively derived. To this end, the following section first maps British, French and German 
party political debates on takeover regulation from the 1950s onward and then presents 
data on corporate ownership patterns in these countries. Comparison of party political 
debates reveals cross-national variation on two dimensions. First, the timing of debate 
varies considerably. In Britain, takeover regulation first entered the political agenda in 
the early 1950s. In Germany, it was a non-issue until the mid-1990s. In France, it re-
ceived little attention until the mid-1980s, then provoked passionate reactions before 
vanishing from the agenda, only to resurface again ten years later. In all three coun-
tries, debate was sparked off by controversial takeover battles that could not have taken 
place without some degree of ownership dispersion. Second, party positions on takeover 
regulation differ across countries. In Britain, left/right competition from the 1950s un-
til the arrival of Tony Blair was a straightforward battle between capital and labor. In 
Germany, left/right positions are reversed, with Social Democrats, Greens and Socialists 
all joining the Liberal Party to promote outside shareholder interests against Christian 
Democrat resistance. In France, left and right are barely distinguishable due to equal 
ambivalence on both sides. 
The data on corporate ownership patterns show that cross-national differences in left/
right party positions correspond to different degrees of ownership dispersion. In Brit-
ain, where Conservatives were most supportive of rules protecting outside shareholders, 
dispersed ownership is far more widespread than in Germany and France, where con-
servative parties defended the interests of insiders. Higher ownership concentration, 
more extensive corporate cross-shareholdings and powerful banks may also explain 
why, unlike British Labour, leftist parties in Germany and France could speak up for 
outside shareholders without abandoning their anti-capitalist rhetoric.
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British, French and German party political debate  
over takeover regulation, 1953–2003
Britain: Early, frequent and heated debate along a traditional left/right cleavage
In Britain, takeover regulation first entered the political agenda in the early 1950s in 
response to the previously unknown phenomenon of hostile bids. Heated debate dur-
ing the 1959 election campaign followed controversial bids for British Aluminium and 
the brewing company Watney Mann and a major City scandal involving takeover mal-
practice. As Roberts (1992: 137) explains, “[t]he City had long been a bête noire of some 
Labour politicians, and take-overs provided a “live issue on which to arraign the gov-
ernment’.” The Financial Times reckoned that “the average person … is so offended 
by the trappings of some bids and mergers that he tends to be sickened by the whole 
process,” making takeovers “just about the only issue on which the Socialists could win 
an election these days” (Financial Times, July 7, 1959; cited in Roberts 1992: 137). A 
second peak of political interest, during the late 1980s, occurred in the wake of high-
profile controversial takeover battles for British Leyland, Pilkington and Rowntree and 
an insider trading scandal at Guinness. 
Labour conformed to the conventional image of a leftist, anti-shareholder party for 
most of the period under consideration. In 1953–1954, Labour party spokesmen, in-
cluding Hugh Gaitskell, Roy Jenkins and Harold Wilson, complained about the asset 
stripping and large tax-free profits associated with hostile bids (Johnston 1980: 10–12). 
During a heated Commons debate in June 1959, Labour MPs condemned takeovers as 
“economic gang warfare.” Harold Wilson, then shadow chancellor, accused the Conser-
vative government of serving shareholders at the expense of the national interest:
Just as shareholders are becoming more and more avid for quick gains, so the Government 
regard any quick capital gains as good business, to be encouraged whatever the production 
realities. Of course, the capitalist international knows no national frontiers. In the presence of 
a quick profit the patriotism of the government melts like snow in the summer sun …  
(Commons Hansard 1959: 36–37)
Evoking the image of class struggle, Wilson calculated how long it would take a “coal 
miner in the most profitable mine in the country” or a “Lancashire mule spinner, after 
thirty years in the industry” to earn the sums associated with takeovers. He asked the 
government how it could
appeal for wage restraint in the payment of a job honestly and well done, while millions of 
pounds can be made in this effortless manner by a section which does no work at all? … These 
people “toil not, neither do they spin” yet their gains are out of all proportion to any services 
they render to that industry. (Commons Hansard 1959: 39–42)
Thirty years later, the same rhetoric was still in use. In 1986 and 1987, Roy Hattersley, 
shadow chancellor, branded the Thatcher administration as a “government of the City, 
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for the City, and by far too large an extent by the City” that would not address the prob-
lems created by takeovers (Guardian, March 13, 1986). Labour’s campaign coordinator 
Bryan Gould complained on TV about 
the sort of society which the present government has tried to bring about. It’s a get rich, some-
thing for nothing sort of society where people can get enormous rewards not related in any way 
to the real contribution they make to our economy. (Newswire, February 18, 1987)
Tony Blair, at that time Labour’s industry spokesman, questioned whether thirty or 
forty fund managers were the right people to decide the future of key industrial sectors 
(Financial Times, May 28, 1988). From 1991 onward, the Labour party toned down its 
confrontational rhetoric. Mo Mowlam, Labour’s spokeswoman for the City, announced 
that “[u]p until now there has been a natural antagonism between the City and Labour. 
That has now passed.” But at the same time, Mowlam declared that industry was “pig-
sick” of its vulnerability to predators (Financial Times, April 26, 1991: 13). 
The desire to control the takeover process was also reflected in Labour’s policy ini-
tiatives. Harold Wilson’s Labour government, elected in 1964, brought large mergers 
within the ambit of the monopolies legislation, thereby increasing the scope for govern-
ment intervention in takeovers (Johnston 1980: 165). Labour’s proposals while in op-
position included incorporating the Takeover Code and Takeover Panel into a statutory 
framework of City regulation; asking companies to prove that industrial or commercial 
gains would come from a proposed merger; replacing the “Tebbit doctrine” – which 
made competition the main test for barring takeovers – with other public interest tests, 
including research and development; lowering the threshold triggering mandatory bids; 
assuring employee consultation on takeovers; and changing the tax treatment of share 
ownership to produce a bias in favor of long-term holdings (see Callaghan 2006).
Labour’s stance on takeover regulation changed shortly before Tony Blair’s 1997 election 
victory. In February 1997, a commission established by the left-leaning Institute of Pub-
lic Policy Research pronounced that “[t]here should be no new administrative restraints 
on takeovers.” Since its election in May 1997, the Labour government has followed this 
advice. In June 2000, Stephen Byers, trade and industry spokesman, told a conference 
organized by the Trades Union Congress that reforms intended to make companies pay 
more attention to stakeholders were not on the government’s agenda (Financial Times, 
June 8, 2000: 8). In May 2001, Tony Blair promised a shake-up of business merger law 
to facilitate takeovers, proud to be
right in the centre of the City of London, one of the main financial institutions, launching our 
business manifesto with the support of many successful business people and able, credibly, to 
claim after four years the mantle of economic confidence and economic stability in our coun-
try. I don’t suppose there is a greater indication of the change in British politics than that and 
certainly there is nothing that we have done over the past four years that I am prouder of than 
that. (Guardian, May 30, 2001: 16)
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Britain’s Conservatives throughout the period provided the counter-rhetoric to La-
bour’s traditional leftist stance, branding their opponent as anti-capitalist and depicting 
themselves as the saviors of free markets and private property. During a Commons de-
bate in 1959, Derick Heathcoat Amory, Chancellor of the Exchequer, countered Harold 
Wilson’s complaint about takeovers by arguing that 
the [Labour] Government of which he [Wilson] was a member did quite a bit of taking-over, 
and it seems that the Opposition are planning to thrust more down the throats of the people if 
they ever again get the chance. There is, however, one vital dis-qualification. The take-overs of 
the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues were compulsory ones, with no choice to the own-
ers. What the right hon. Gentleman today has been inveighing against are take-overs with the 
collective approval of the owners of the businesses concerned. That is a significant distinction.  
(Commons Hansard 1959: 63)
In the same vein, Cecil Parkinson, a former secretary for trade and industry, suggested, 
three decades later, that City concern with short-term interests was partly Labour’s fault:
One of the reasons why our investors shorten their thinking is because of the uncertainty that 
could arise if we have a change of government. Unlike other successful capitalist countries, we 
have an Opposition which basically doesn’t believe in private enterprise and does not support 
the system. (Guardian, January 29, 1987)
The Conservatives defended shareholder-value orientation both for its own sake and 
as a means to better overall economic performance. In 1959, Heathcoat Amory insisted 
that “we have to accept that the control of a business is vested in its shareholders” and 
that, on balance, takeovers to date had been “beneficial rather than harmful from the 
point of view of the efficiency of industry, of the interests of the employees concerned 
and of the economy at large” (Commons Hansard 1959: 65–67).
Similarly, Kenneth Clarke, then minister for trade and industry, declared, in 1987, that 
[t]he Conservative party believes that the greatest national public interest lies in allowing such 
things [as takeovers] to take place within the market place. … It is contrary to all experience to 
believe that an industrial strategy, as managed by Labour Ministers, is in the interests of employ-
ees, compared with the decisions of shareholders in the free market economy that we are now 
operating. (Commons Hansard 1988: 333)
The argument that takeover threats could help keep managers in check was also regu-
larly invoked, especially by Thatcher’s supporters, who regarded barriers to hostile bids 
as incompatible with government efforts to bring in “the refreshing winds of competi-
tion.” Lord Young, then secretary for trade and industry, dismissed calls for better pro-
tection against bids as “ingenious schemes to protect sitting directors” (Times, March 
1, 1989). Determined to promote the best interest of business even against the express 
wishes of the peak employer federation, he explained that “[i]f we were to follow the 
sort of policy it [the CBI] advocates, the economy would soon lose its competitive edge” 
(Financial Times, November 9, 1998: 11).
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Unlike their French and German counterparts, British Conservatives were deeply di-
vided over takeover regulation, with a sizeable faction resenting the pro-shareholder 
stance of their party leaders. In 1959, the Financial Times suspected that, on a free vote, 
a motion condemning hostile takeovers brought by the Labour opposition would have 
been carried by a majority of two to one. During a Commons debate in January 1987, 
Edward Heath, the former Conservative Prime Minister, condemned predators moving 
into long-established family firms which had set aside money for long-term investment 
(Commons Hansard 1987: 792–795). Sir Anthony Grant, “as traditional a Tory MP as 
one could find,” regretted that the energy spent on takeover deals was not invested into 
building up productive business (Times, January 18, 1987). In 1988, Crossbow, the pub-
lication of the Conservative Bow Group, called for a change of rules to ensure “that 
takeover activity is not undertaken at a frenetic pace at the behest of City interests” 
(Times, August 8, 1988). Peter Lilley, trade and industry secretary under Thatcher and 
Major, said in October 1990 that deal-making in London’s capital market had gone 
“beyond the economically justifiable to become almost an end in itself” and that share-
holder value pressure could not be dismissed as a factor feeding short-termism (Finan-
cial Times, October 25, 1990). Less than two weeks after Thatcher’s resignation, even 
John Redwood, former head of the Prime Minister’s policy unit, with a reputation as a 
free-marketeer, joined the chorus by referring to evidence that,
except in the very short term, takeovers can all too often damage the wealth of shareholders 
of the bidding company rather than improve it. Only a limited number of British compa-
nies have been adept at taking over others and taking the business on to better success.  
(Independent, December 8, 1990)
Many Conservatives also criticized the Thatcher government’s non-interference with 
foreign takeovers. In the context of the 1986 bid for British Leyland (BL), Tory MPs 
supporting the “Keep BL British” campaign pressed the government to cease talks 
with General Motors and concentrate on negotiating with UK organizations (Finan-
cial Times, February 17, 1986). In June 1988, more than 60 Conservative MPs signed a 
Commons motion brought by the Labour party against the government decision not to 
refer Nestlé’s bid for Rowntree to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (Toronto 
Star, June 2, 1988: 28). Crossbow accused Lord Young of “blatantly and shamelessly” 
ignoring the regional dimension in merger policy (Financial Times, August 8, 1988).
However, the pro-shareholder faction always maintained the upper hand in the Tory 
party. Conservative governments never yielded to calls for legislative or political inter-
vention that were advanced not just by the Labour opposition but also from within their 
own ranks. In 1984, Norman Tebbit, then secretary for trade and industry, renounced 
the main instrument of intervention available to British governments by announcing 
that, henceforth, takeovers would only be referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Com-
mission if there were reason to fear significant adverse effects on competition. During 
the years that followed, the government resisted pressure to prevent foreign takeovers 
of British “crown jewels” including British Leyland, Pilkington and Rowntree (Financial 
Times, May 16, 1988: 1). The change in Conservative rhetoric after Thatcher’s depar-
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ture was not matched by any significant change in policy. An all-party parliamentary 
select committee on trade and industry recommended wide-ranging changes to take-
over law in 1991 and again in 1994, but these recommendations were not implemented 
(Financial Times, December 20, 1991; Independent, April 29, 1994). Instead, the Major 
government sought to address the problem of market myopia by promoting private 
coordination. Tax breaks to encourage long-term shareholdings were ruled out in favor 
of attempts to improve communication between investors and managers over business 
aims and investment plans (Financial Times, October 25, 1990: 8). In the same spirit, 
the 1995 Myners Report Developing a Winning Partnership “described what institutional 
investors should do but did nothing to ensure they would do so” (Howard 2005: 792–
795).
Germany: Late debate with inverse left/right positions
In Germany, takeover regulation was a non-issue until the mid-1990s. The country 
lacked not just binding rules regarding the conduct of takeovers but also the political 
will to create them, despite periodic attempts by the European Commission from 1974 
onward to promote takeover law harmonization (see Callaghan 2006). Both chambers 
of the German parliament unanimously rejected the 1989 draft of the EU takeover di-
rective on the grounds that there was “no need for regulation” (Deutscher Bundestag 
1990; Deutscher Bundesrat 1989). A complete absence of hostile takeovers until the 
1990s provides the backdrop to this lack of political interest in takeover regulation until 
after unification, when more German firms started turning to the stock market to fi-
nance their investments. As in Britain and France, political passions were first aroused 
by large-scale hostile bids. The 1997 battle between Krupp and Thyssen brought thirty-
five thousand steelworkers to the streets in protest (see Ziegler 2000: 210). Two years 
later, 62 percent of Germans surveyed thought that Vodaphone’s takeover of Mannes-
mann would be bad for their country, while only 19 percent welcomed the idea of Ger-
man companies being taken over by foreigners (Associated Press Worldstream, Febru-
ary 9, 2000).
When takeover battles in the late 1990s brought the issue to the forefront of the political 
agenda, all parties condemned hostile bids. In response to Krupp’s hostile bid for Thys-
sen AG in 1997, “[p]oliticians from left to right, from state government to federal gov-
ernment, union leaders, the media, all protested against the Krupp move and clamored 
to have the tender offer withdrawn” (Hellwig 2000: 122). Vodaphone’s bid for Man-
nesmann two years later met with similar cross-party condemnation. In the Christian 
Democratic Party (CDU), Chancellor Helmut Kohl, expressing “grave concern” about 
the job impact of a Thyssen takeover, appealed for a “common-sense solution” in the 
interests of employees and the German economy (Financial Times, March 20, 1997). 
Employment minister Norbert Blüm urged bankers to remember that “companies do 
not consist only of capital, but also of people” (Welt am Sonntag, March 30, 1997). 
Deputy chairman Wolfgang Schäuble declared that unsolicited bids “do not fit with 
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our company culture” (BBC Monitoring Europe, November 22, 1999). Jürgen Rüttgers, 
leader of the opposition in North Rhine-Westphalia, declared that “hostile takeovers in 
the style of Manchester capitalism are incompatible with the concept of a social market 
economy” (Schulten 1999). In the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Gerhard Schröder’s 
comment on Krupp’s bid was that “those who treat companies as cash cows have un-
derstood nothing” (Welt am Sonntag, March 23, 1997). After Vodafone’s bid, he ex-
pressed a general dislike for hostile bids and warned that a takeover would “damage the 
corporate culture” of Mannesmann (Capital, January 1, 2000). Wolfgang Clement, first 
minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, accused Vodafone of “playing monopoly with the 
Mannesmann company against the interests of the employees, the works councilors, 
the management and the supervisory board” (Schulten 1999). Finance minister Hans 
Eichel spoke of a “culture clash between Anglo-American capitalism and the consensual 
German model” (Schulten 1999). The economics spokeswoman for the Green party saw 
Krupp’s bid as “further proof that the power of banks had taken on proportions harm-
ful to the economy” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 20, 1997). Even the Liberal 
party (FDP) was reluctant to endorse active markets for corporate control. The federal 
economics minister Günther Rexrodt cautiously admitted to the view that Krupp’s bid 
was “within the limits of what is socially permissible.” Politicians might take an interest 
in and comment upon such instances, but they could not prevent them. “In the end, 
companies must emerge that can withstand competition in the longrun and [thereby] 
avoid sudden job cuts” (Associated Press Worldstream, March 20, 1997). Yet despite his 
laissez-faire rhetoric, Rexrodt was among those who “bounced Krupp into negotiations 
with Thyssen” (Independent, March 23, 1997). With regard to the Mannesmann take-
over, Liberal party leader Wolfgang Gerhardt warned against “a dangerous concentra-
tion of power at the consumer’s expense” (Der Spiegel, February 6, 2000). 
However, outside the spotlight of public attention cast on the issue by these unpopular 
bids, party positions were more nuanced and, by contrast to pre-Blair UK, a conven-
tional left/right framework does not capture the main cleavage line. During the late 
1990s, the Social Democrats, Greens and Socialists (PDS) all joined the Liberals to 
support the dismantling of two major structural barriers to takeover bids in Germany, 
namely the system of proxy voting by banks and the tight network of cross-ownership, 
while the Christian Democrats defended these characteristic features of “Germany Inc” 
(see Cioffi 2002; Höpner 2003; Cioffi/Höpner 2006).
The FDP, consistent with its ideological commitment to economic liberalism, strongly 
supported active markets for corporate control. The Liberals were a driving force behind 
the 1998 Control and Transparency Act (KonTraG) which stripped German firms of 
important takeover defenses by placing limits on proxy voting and abolishing unequal 
voting rights, voting caps and the voting of cross-shareholding stakes above twenty-five 
percent in supervisory board elections. When the KonTraG was debated in the Bundes-
tag in 1997, Otto Graf Lambsdorff called Germany a rent-seeking society and insisted 
that German companies would benefit from increased exposure to capital market pres-
sures (Höpner 2003: 21). During a debate on the German takeover law in 2001, FDP 
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member Rainer Funke complained that the chancellor had caved in to trade unions and 
managers instead of facing international competition (Deutscher Bundestag 2001a).
More surprisingly, the center-left SPD during the late 1990s also supported the disman-
tling of takeover barriers, before suddenly reversing its stance in 2001. In 1997, while still 
in opposition, the SPD took the initiative of presenting the draft for a German takeover 
law, which, like the EU takeover directive, contained a neutrality rule and mandatory 
bid rule. The Control and Transparency Act, presented by the FDP/CDU coalition gov-
ernment in 1997, was criticized by the SPD as insufficiently shareholder-oriented. Dur-
ing a Bundestag debate on the proposal, Hans-Martin Bury (SPD) called the KonTraG 
a “placebo law designed to appease the public without introducing any real change, a 
law to protect managers and banks against shareholders.” He argued that the German 
corporate sector was stifled by the power of banks, interlocking directorates, lack of 
transparency and underdeveloped markets for corporate control and demanded a ban 
on bank ownership of industrial shares (Deutscher Bundestag 1998: 20354). Eckehard 
Pieck added that the protection of shareholders and the development of the capital 
market were important goals for the SPD (Deutscher Bundestag 1998: 20365). Four 
years later, during a Bundestag debate on the German takeover law, Nina Hauer insisted 
that “the shareholders own the corporation and should have the final say” (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2001b: 19829). Upon coming to power in 1998, the Social Democrats, in co-
alition with the Green Party, immediately passed the KonTraG, which stripped German 
firms of important defenses against hostile bids. Two years later, they abolished capital 
gains tax on the sale of large share blocks, to unwind the web of cross-shareholdings 
which had traditionally made takeovers difficult (Cioffi 2002: 38).
Left of the SPD, the Green and Socialist parties during the late 1990s also supported the 
removal of takeover barriers. As Ziegler explains, the Greens used the issue of corporate 
governance “to criticize established concentrations of economic power as obstacles to 
desirable types of change. Much like the Social Democrats, the Greens attacked the 
multiple sources of influence that the large universal banks exercised over German 
firms. Much like the liberals, they argued ever more pointedly through the 1990s that 
Germany needed a modern equity market to support entrepreneurs in the small and 
medium-sized sector.” The Socialists shared the desire to curb the power of banks and 
interlocking capital. During a Bundestag debate on the KonTraG, Uwe-Ernst Heuer for 
the PDS explained that more active markets for corporate control would democratize 
and revitalize the economy (Ziegler 2000: 205).
This left the Christian Democrats as the main defenders of Germany’s structural bar-
riers to hostile bids. During a Bundestag debate on SPD proposals for a German take-
over law in 1997, members of the CDU rejected the draft as “too early and too wide-
ranging” and maintained that, to date, the absence of a takeover law had not done any 
harm (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 4, 1997). Instead, they favored a self-
regulatory system based on the voluntary takeover code introduced in 1995. During a 
Bundestag debate on the KonTraG in 1998, Joachim Gres (CSU) said that a change of 
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direction in German corporate governance was neither intended nor necessary. “Con-
stancy,” he said, “is important in economic policy … Please don’t think that the job of 
economic policy makers is to permanently introduce new ideas.” Gres also insisted that 
the image of a “Germany Inc.” built upon quasi-cartels did not reflect reality. Hartmut 
Schauerte (CDU) dismissed calls for curbing the power of banks as “pure ideology” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2001c). Klaus-Heiner Lehne (CDU), rapporteur for the directive 
in the European Parliament, played a key role in mobilizing his fellow MEPs against the 
neutrality rule and proudly claimed credit when the European Parliament rejected the 
directive in 2001.
France: Sporadic debate with ambivalent left/right positions
In France, political interest was sporadic. Hostile takeovers were unknown until the late 
1960s, when three hostile bids, although unsuccessful, occasioned a brief spell of debate 
resulting in France’s first takeover code (see von Kapff 1975: 162–165). The following 
decade of silence on the issue was a period of low takeover activity. “Between 1965 
and 1975, less than a hundred takeovers occurred, and all were friendly. In the years 
1976, 1977 and 1978 about twenty takeovers a year occurred, most of them friendly. 
From 1979 to 1986 takeovers steadily declined in number” (Daigre 1990: 92). However, 
this figure increased sharply from 1986 on, sparking off the political reactions docu-
mented below. While the actual number of takeovers remained low by Anglo-American 
standards,1 the rise was sufficient to inspire headlines such as “Paris gripped by take-
over fever” (Financial Times, April 2, 1986), “The [French takeover] bandwagon gathers 
pace” (Financial Times, November 26, 1986), “The French acquisition bug bites deeply” 
(Financial Times, June 15, 1987), or “Voracious [French] appetite for acquisitions” (Fi-
nancial Times, May 9, 1990). The French acronym for takeover bid (OPA) became “a 
cult word to use in every context from political commentaries to illicit love-affairs” 
(Financial Times, April 11, 1988). As in Britain, takeover battles and scandals over con-
troversial bidding practices heated up the political atmosphere. In March 1988, the bid 
for Télémécanique, an industrial automation company, by the Schnei der electrical en-
gineering group brought thousands of workers out onto the streets (Financial Times, 
April 11, 1988). In February 1989, insider-trading in the takeover of American can mak-
er Triangle by the French state-owned Pechiney group, which involved a close personal 
friend of Mitterand, forced a senior finance ministry official to resign (Financial Times, 
January 21, 1989). Around the same time, insider trading involving the state savings 
bank, Caisse des Dépots et Consignations, was also suspected in the attempted bid for 
Société Générale, then France’s leading privatized bank (Financial Times, January 12, 
1989). Takeover law reforms in the early 1990s followed several instances of discrimina-
1 For 1988 and 1989, the SDC Platinum database, which provides data on the number of hostile 
takeovers from 1988 onward, counts 6 and 5 hostile takeovers in France, compared to 41 and 35 
in the UK, and 86 and 47 in the US. Systematic data for earlier years has proved impossible to 
come by.
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tion against minority shareholders in the context of partial bids (Le Monde, March 20, 
1992: 19; Le Monde, November 25, 1991: 13; Le Monde, December 13, 1991: 13). The 
subsequent period of relative calm was one of low takeover activity. Political interest 
only returned in October 1996 when French employer federations AFEP and “Entre-
prise et Cité” launched papers demanding reforms of French takeover law to make take-
overs more difficult (Le Monde, October 15, 1996). One observer explains the sudden 
mobilization after years of complacency by pointing to changes in corporate ownership 
structures: 
[Until recently], few French companies considered themselves attractive to foreign investors. … 
But they now find themselves in a state of weakness that is cause for concern. … French compa-
nies see themselves as potential victims of takeovers, all the more because the “hard core” (noyau 
dur) system of cross-shareholdings put in place ten years ago is dissolving.
(Le Monde, October 15, 1996: 19)2
As in Germany and Britain, and in line with populist sentiment, the immediate politi-
cal response to hostile bids was passionately hostile. During his presidential reelection 
campaign in April 1988, Mitterrand called for regulatory intervention to tame “finan-
cial anarchy and savage takeovers,” deeming it “time for the triumph of an economy of 
short-termist speculation to come to an end” (Mitterrand 1988). A year later, during 
a TV interview shortly before the French municipal elections, he warned his audience 
“against takeover mania, against the gangsterism and the rule of the strongest” and 
promised to
defend French producers, company managers, French entrepreneurs, against this wandering 
money, these birds of prey, who grab all this … without having taken part in the daily effort. 
That’s too easy! So I say that the role of the state, in this area, is a major role. The state can pre-
vent things. (Le Monde, February 14, 1989)
However, the accumulated words and actions of French politicians both on the left and 
right send a less clear-cut message. Edouard Balladur, Gaullist finance minister under 
prime minister Jacques Chirac, explained in 1988 that, regarding takeovers,
[t]wo things need to be taken into account. First, protecting the continuity of companies and 
the interests of their shareholders and employees. Second, ensuring that the companies do not 
seal themselves off, blocking all evolution, all alliance formation, all restructuring. Where is the 
good measure between these contradictory aims? It clearly depends on the circumstances.
(Le Monde, March 1, 1988)
Balladur’s successor Pierre Bérégovoy, Socialist finance minister under prime minister 
Michel Rocard, opened a parliamentary debate in 1989 by declaring that
[t]he government wants to neither prevent nor encourage takeovers, but the role of the leg-
islator and of the market authorities is to guarantee the clarity and legality of the rules of the 
game … (Le Monde, April 21, 1989: 44)
2 All French quotations have been translated into English by the author.
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Gaullist prime minister Jacques Chirac announced in 1996 that “[w]e do not want to 
return to protectionism, but we don’t want to sell out either” (Le Monde, October 15, 
1996: 19).
These ambivalent attitudes are also reflected in legislative measures. The Gaullists in 
1986 embarked on the privatization of French industry, but not without creating golden 
shares and interlocking capital structures to protect the previously state-owned enter-
prises against hostile bids (see Le Monde, June 13, 1987: 4). Foreign ownership of priva-
tized companies was initially limited to a maximum of 20 percent (Financial Times, 
June 15, 1987: IV). In March 1988, following takeover battles over Prouvost, Téléméca-
nique, Rhin-Rhône and Compagnie de Midi, Balladur suggested that 
the recent takeover developments should lead us to consider whether it would not be useful, 
in certain cases, to increase the stabilized portion of capital of companies that are particularly 
threatened, and to reduce the number of candidates so that the hard core becomes less fragile.
(Le Monde, March 4, 1988: 27)
Balladur also asked the French stock market authorities to reinforce companies’ defense 
options against hostile bids. The stock market authorities turned down his request, but 
three less radical rules designed to reduce the number of hostile bids were adopted 
in April 1988 (Vie Française, May 14, 1988). In 1995, Alain Madelin, then economics 
minister, abolished the legal requirement for all foreign takeovers to be registered with 
and formally approved by the government (Financial Times, June 20, 1996). However, 
one year later, Jacques Chirac felt that, “by comparison to our main competitors, we are 
too open at times” (Le Monde, October 5, 1996: 31) and initiated three changes to the 
French takeover code to make hostile bids more difficult (Le Monde, October 11, 1996; 
Le Monde, March 21, 1997).
Socialist policies were similarly ambivalent. Between 1984 and 1986, during his first 
term in office under the Socialist government of Laurent Fabius, economics minister 
Bérégovoy launched France on its path of financial modernization by pruning credit 
and exchange controls and creating new markets for commercial paper and financial 
futures. In 1986, he gave up his ministry’s right to veto all French takeovers. However, 
as takeover activity increased, Bérégovoy stepped on the breaks. In the spring of 1988, 
while still in opposition, he proposed creating a special investment fund to intervene in 
takeover battles on behalf of a besieged management. Back in office, he responded to 
a series of takeover scandals in the spring of 1989 by passing a bill on the “Safety and 
Transparency of the Financial Markets,” which strengthened the disciplinary powers of 
the Commission des Opérations de Bourse (COB), the French stock market watchdog. 
The bill also strengthened employee information rights in the context of takeover bids, 
allowed target companies to augment capital in order to dilute the proportion of shares 
held by bidders, required the CEO to inform the comité d’entreprise (works council) of 
takeovers in progress and introduced transparency requirements regarding the crossing 
of thresholds and the revelation of shareholder pacts (Le Monde, April 21, 1989: 44). 
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The Nouvelles Régulations Économiques (NRE), passed by the Socialist government of 
Lionel Jospin, strengthened employee information by depriving bidders of all voting 
rights acquired during an offer until they would comply with the obligation of discuss-
ing their intentions with the works council. The NRE also broadened the scope for state 
intervention by requiring potential bidders for a bank or insurance company to inform 
either the economics minister or the president of the committee of banks and invest-
ment companies in advance of an offer. However, they also suspended shareholder pacts 
involving more than 0.5 percent of capital for the duration of the offer period, thereby 
facilitating hostile bids (Echos, May 14, 2001: 67). 
Corporate ownership structure in Britain, Germany and France
Cross-national differences in left/right party positions correlate with different degrees 
of ownership dispersion. In Britain, where Conservatives were most supportive of rules 
protecting outside shareholders, dispersed ownership is far more widespread than in 
Germany and France, where conservative parties defended the interests of insiders. The 
stark contrast between British, French and German levels of ownership concentration 
is captured by several indicators. First, listed companies in the UK account for a much 
larger fraction of total national corporate activity than in Germany or France. In Brit-
ain, since 1986, the number of domestic companies listed on the stock exchange has 
hovered between approximately 1,800 and 2,400, out of a total population of around 
500,000 firms. In Germany, it grew from less than 500 in 1986 to around 750 in 2004. 
In France, the number and growth trajectory of listings was very similar to Germany 
until 1997, before rising to just over a thousand at the turn of the millennium.3 The 
total value of companies quoted on the stock market was also much higher in Britain, 
where market capitalization as a percentage of GDP exceeded 70 percent throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s and again from 1986 onwards, climaxing at 200 percent around the 
turn of the millennium. In Germany and France, market capitalization throughout the 
post-war period was well below half the British level (Global Financial Data4; see also 
Rajan and Zingales 2003: 15).
Second, ownership concentration of listed companies is much lower in Britain than 
Germany or France. In all the years for which data are available, more than 50 percent 
of French and German companies had a blockholder owning more than 50 percent of 
shares, and 70 percent of companies had at least one blockholder owning more than 
25 percent of shares. In Britain, the proportion of companies with a majority block-
holder never exceeded 6 percent, and the proportion of companies with at least one 
blockholder owning more than 25 percent of shares never exceeded 16 percent (Berglöf 
1990: 126; Becht/Mayer 2001: 2; Van der Elst 2004). 
3 DAI Factbook 2004, table 02-3.
4 GFD Database <www.globalfinancialdata.com>.
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Third, cross-shareholdings are far less common in Britain than in Germany or France. 
From 1970 to the late 1990s, non-financial enterprises held around 40 percent of all 
German shares, compared to 5 percent in the UK. Since then, the German network of 
inter-company shareholdings has shown some signs of dissolution, with share-owner-
ship by non-financial enterprises dropping below 30 percent for the first time in 1999. 
The number of capital ties between the 100 biggest German companies declined from 
169 to 80 between 1996 and 2000 (Beyer/Höpner 2003: 184). However, despite these re-
cent developments, corporate cross-shareholdership remains very high by international 
standards. 
Fourth, until recently, the role of banks in corporate ownership was much more pro-
nounced in Germany than elsewhere. Under the system of bank proxy voting rights 
(Depotstimmrecht), private shareholders authorized the banks where their shares were 
deposited to vote on their behalf at companies’ annual shareholder meetings. As a re-
sult, the controlling influence of banks was far greater than their direct equity holdings 
suggested. As dominant shareholders, mainly by proxy, banks were until recently repre-
sented on the supervisory boards of most German companies, acting as a shield against 
hostile bids.5
4 Implications
By uniting two important, but often unrelated, research areas, my article throws new 
light on debates both in comparative politics and political economy. First, it informs the 
literature on political parties by observing that capital is not a homogenous constitu-
ency on corporate governance issues and that party positions are therefore affected by 
national patterns of corporate ownership. Like much of the literature, I assume that 
party positions reflect the interests of their core constituencies, and that parties on the 
right cater to “upscale socio-economic groups.” I depart from the traditional framework 
by noting that the relevant conflict line on takeover regulation is not between upscale 
and downscale socio-economic groups, but between insiders (including workers, man-
agers, blockholders), and outsiders (i.e. dispersed shareholders). Since the relative size 
of the insider and outsider constituencies varies across countries and over time, my ap-
proach helps explain variation of left/right party positions that is not accounted for by 
the traditional framework.
Second, I advance the research initiated by Cioffi and Höpner (2006) by showing that 
and explaining why their “political paradox of finance capitalism” obtains in some 
5 In 1996, the supervisory boards of 29 of the 100 largest firms were chaired by representatives of 
Deutsche Bank. Since then, the strategic reorientation of large German banks has resulted in a 
loosening of ties with industrial companies. See Beyer/Höpner (2003).
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countries but not in others. While concurring with Cioffi and Höpner that ties between 
conservative parties and corporate elites influence the position of the center-right, I 
challenge their assumption that corporate elites everywhere oppose shareholder-ori-
ented reforms. In my model, the preferences of corporate elites are more heterogeneous 
and affected by the structure of corporate ownership. This is partly because I use a more 
encompassing definition of corporate elites. Cioffi and Höpner focus on a “managerial 
elite distinct from finance capital.” In my paper, the core clientele of center-right par-
ties includes both managers and shareholders. However, even if the focus were only on 
managers, there is reason to believe that ownership affects preferences. I show elsewhere 
that British managers are more supportive of active markets for corporate control than 
their German counterparts – even though more dispersed ownership makes them more 
likely to fall victim to hostile bids (Callaghan 2006: 145–170). This may be because, 
during long years of exposure to hostile bids, British managers have developed better 
coping mechanisms, including more flexible managerial labor markets and production 
strategies that are less dependent on patient capital.
Third, my paper challenges existing work on the relationship between ownership pat-
terns and minority shareholder protection. Most authors explain correlations between 
ownership dispersion and various political factors by treating ownership as the depen-
dent variable. Roe (2003) argues that “social democracy” discourages ownership dis-
persion by making it more difficult for outside shareholders to claim primacy vis-à-vis 
other stakeholders, including workers. Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) suggest that the 
larger number of veto players in consensus-oriented as opposed to majoritarian political 
systems favors concentrated ownership by encouraging corporatist coalitions between 
managers, workers and blockholders against outside owners. La Porta et al. (2000) claim 
that the degree of dispersion depends on the quality of corporate law, including minor-
ity shareholder protection. I argue that a causal arrow runs in the opposite direction, 
from ownership structures to politics and corporate law. Outside shareholders must 
first emerge as a sizeable constituency before a political party will advance their cause. 
Unlike the arguments discussed above, mine is compatible with Coffee’s (2001: 66) ob-
servation that, historically, political and legal efforts to protect shareholders have tended 
to follow, rather than precede, the appearance of securities markets. 
Fourth, my paper speaks to the literatures on Varieties of Capitalism and institutional 
change by suggesting that political support for shareholder capitalism is greater in Brit-
ain than in Germany not because actors in both countries know about and seek to de-
fend the comparative institutional advantage of their production regimes, but simply 
because Britain has more shareholders. The assumption prevailing in the Varieties of 
Capitalism literature that interest groups care mainly about preserving the comparative 
institutional advantage of their national production regime makes it difficult to explain 
moves away from equilibrium. Widespread recent growth in support for shareholder-
oriented corporate governance is easier to explain once ownership structure is recog-
nized as a determinant of preferences and party positions. My argument implies that 
increased ownership dispersion due to privatization, tax changes or the like may under-
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mine political support for stakeholder-friendly corporate governance rules regardless 
of their contribution to the comparative institutional advantage of coordinated market 
economies.
Beyond that, my paper opens up several agendas for further research. I do not claim 
that insider–outsider divides single-handedly explain all variation in party positions 
on every corporate governance issue across countries and over time. To mention just 
one remaining puzzle, ownership in the US is as dispersed as in the UK, but political 
support for anti-takeover measures is stronger and spread more evenly across the parti-
san divide. Since the limited number of advanced industrialized democracies rules out 
large-N multivariate regression, further case studies and empirical research on the mi-
cro-foundations of alternative analytic models seem the most promising way forward.
First, more nuanced descriptions of ownership patterns and their relationship to politi-
cal preferences would be desirable. My paper takes only one of many necessary steps 
toward disaggregating capital. While the insider–outsider distinction is reasonably in-
formative on the issue of takeover regulation, it may not be the most relevant cleavage 
on all corporate governance issues. Among the insiders, one could distinguish further 
between managers and owners of listed and unlisted, small and large companies of dif-
ferent sectors, between family owners, banks, the state as blockholder in nationalized 
enterprises, etc.. Among the outsiders, individual shareholders differ from various types 
of institutional investors, including pension funds, hedge funds and mutual funds. Who 
wants what on any particular issue is impossible to ascertain analytically because no 
model is better than its assumptions, and standard assumptions such as the idea that 
material interests can be inferred from material positions remain highly controversial. 
A systematic empirical study of lobbying efforts by groups representing different seg-
ments of capital would alleviate some of these concerns. 
Second, the effect of variables other than ownership structure on the politics of corpo-
rate governance merits further exploration. Macropolitical variables, while insufficient 
by themselves, surely play a role. Apart from the above-mentioned effect of electoral sys-
tems on coalition behavior, differences between federal and unitary systems seem likely 
to be relevant. So far, research into the effect of federalism on corporate governance has 
focused on policy outcomes. For example, Miller (1998: 70–73) argues that “the United 
States federal system stacks the political deck heavily in favor of restrictive takeover 
rules.” Firms have an incentive to lobby against anti-takeover regulation outside the 
state where they are incorporated, but, for two reasons, their lobbying for anti-takeover 
regulation at home is likely to be more effective than their lobbying against anti-take-
over regulation in other states. First, firms are likely to have greater political clout in the 
state in which they are chartered. Second, since potential bidders do not know where 
their future targets will be incorporated, they have to spread their lobbying efforts over 
49 states, thereby diluting their resources (see also Roe 1993: 332–333; Bebchuk/Ferrell 
1999: 1176–1177). It seems worth exploring how federalism affects party competition 
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on corporate governance. More so than the US, the European Union’s multi-level polity 
would be a promising terrain for such studies.
Third, the consequences of the timing and sequencing of debate for the content of de-
bate remain to be examined. My paper demonstrates that British discourse over take-
over regulation preceded German discourse by almost four decades. Timing is likely to 
affect the content of debate not only because economic ideas en vogue in one period may 
be less fashionable decades later. The order in which countries liberalize their markets 
for corporate control is also likely to matter because latecomers suffer disadvantages 
of backwardness. For example, Britain removed barriers to hostile bids at a time when 
cross-border capital mobility was limited, and British firms had decades to adapt to the 
British Takeover Code before it was proposed as a blueprint for regulation throughout 
the European Union. Partly as a result, German firms found themselves in a position of 
asymmetric vulnerability and this seems likely to have affected the content of debate.
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